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Since the publication of Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) behavioural public policies and 
nudge units have been widely adopted right across the world, which has resulted in many 
improvements to the delivery of public policies, such as better tax collection, increased 
access of young people to education opportunities, and more charitable giving. This paper 
asks what explains the adoption of nudge units and related initiatives. In particular, are 
Anglo-American or West European countries the focus for adoption? Are these 
interventions more likely to appear under left, right, or centre-dominated governments? 
Ascertaining the origins of nudge can adjudicate the extent to which nudge is partial project, 
based on the dominance of liberal economies and the preferred programme for centre 
governments and/or right political ideologies, or whether it has more universal appeal. 
Using data from OECD and OECD-partner countries, event history models reveal Anglo-
American countries to be the drivers, with nudge not favoured by left-controlled 
governments. Nonetheless, with the interest and level of policy transfer not abating, in 




Since 2008, there has been a massive interest in the use of behavioural insights or nudges to 
improve the quality of public administration and the delivery of public policies, which is 
highlighted in the work of the UK’s nudge unit, the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), the 
emergence of other nudge units across the world, and in the uses of behavioural science by 
governments at all levels as well as by international organisations 2. In many ways, this 
development can be seen as the result of a natural pattern of diffusion whereby innovations 
that work well tend to transfer across national jurisdictions, dependent on an asymmetry in 
innovation practices between early adopters and later imitators. But what if the pattern 
were path dependent, based on differences in the use of intellectual ideas between Anglo-
American democracies and their relevance in other jurisdictions where ideas from 
economics do not have such hegemony? Ideas from behavioural economics may not have 
such traction and policy-makers might see them too focused on individual behaviour rather 
than reflecting institutional principles and addressing the structural causes of public 
problems. Institutions and policy-making systems have different traditions based on legal 
regulation and patterns of decentralisation of decision-making across ministries and states 
that may favour or limit the use of behavioural insights. Countries may have political parties 
and bureaucracies that are not so engaged with policies to change individual behaviour top-
down. As behavioural insights are adopted across the world in a wide range of jurisdictions 
and regimes, it is important to know whether the energy behind these reforms is limited to 
certain kinds of democracy or whether other kinds of polity, such as China, might be part of 
the diffusion process.  
                                                        
2 Jones, Pykett, and Whitehead, Changing Behaviours; OECD, ‘Behavioural Insights and Public Policy - Lessons 
from Around the World - En - OECD’; Balzo, Nudging in the UK, in the USA, in Denmark, in Italy; Feitsma, 
‘Brokering Behaviour Change’; John, How Far to Nudge?; Thaler, Misbehaving. 
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 This paper begins with a review of this debate by reference to the expansion and 
use of behavioural public policies in the period since 2008. It seeks to understand why 
nudge policies became more acceptable to international organisations and appeared in 
Anglo-American democracies. The paper explores the history of the evolution of key ideas 
through critical theoretical work on neo-liberalism, arguing that a more promising route is 
to examine the role of entrepreneurs and the influence of the contexts that might promote 
transfer, which are the claims in the literature on policy transfer. The evidence is assessed 
using event history statistical models (survival analysis), which can estimate the probability 
of a policy being adopted and which variables predict it, using OECD countries and partners 
as the sample.  
 
Nudge and behavioural public policy 
Nudge originates¾at least in popular parlance¾from the 2008 popular book of that name, 
authored by Thaler and Sunstein 3. Nudge is a classic ‘trade’ book, which academics can 
write when they become famous and have the backing of a leading publisher; but this kind 
of book also depends on the time being right and for a considerable amount of previous 
knowledge to be established beforehand so that the influence of its ideas can occur, which 
can then facilitate their translation into practice and policy 4. Over a period of twenty-five 
years, behavioural economics had already gathered considerable momentum making nudge 
possible. Academic economists and psychologists had successfully introduced more realistic 
psychological traits to modify rational-actor based economic theories, which amounted to a 
new approach in the discipline and had far-reaching implications for how economics is 
                                                        
3 Nudge. 
4 John, How Far to Nudge? 
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studied 5. Behavioural economists and other social scientists then applied these insights to 
real-world situations with policy relevance 6.  
 Even though policy-makers used behavioural insights before the publication of 
Nudge¾for example the Labour governments in the UK elected in 1997 had promoted this 
agenda when Tony Blair’s Strategy Unit was in operation 7¾the book put the topic on 
policy-makers’ radar. It is no coincidence that the coalition government elected in the UK in 
2010, led by Prime Minister David Cameron, set up the world’s first nudge unit8, and that 
Cass Sunstein, one of the co-authors of Nudge, was appointed by President Obama as 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, effectively taking on a 
nudge coordination position within the US federal administration 9. Right from the start, this 
interest appeared in the US and UK rather than elsewhere in terms of media interest and 
commentary, partly because the bulk of early work was being done academically in these 
two countries.10 The interest from the quality press and think thanks then diffused to policy-
makers. As a result, the vast bulk of interventions come from the UK and US, as shown in a 
recent compendium published by OECD 11.  
 There has grown up a critical tradition of assessing nudge that sees it largely as 
expression of neo-liberalism. Critics regard the phenomenon as essentially ideological in 
that it legitimates a form of governance that perpetuates a loss of autonomy of individuals 
and reinforces inequalities of power between them 12. Academics who are suspicious of 
                                                        
5 Thaler, Misbehaving; Lewis, The Undoing Project. 
6 John, How Far to Nudge? 
7 Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit. 
8 John, ‘Policy Entrepreneurship in UK Central Government’. 
9 Sunstein, Simpler. 
10 John, How Far to Nudge? 
11 OECD, ‘Behavioural Insights and Public Policy - Lessons from Around the World - En - OECD’. 
12 Jones, Pykett, and Whitehead, Changing Behaviours. 
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nudge see it as commensurate with a neoliberal state 13. They also use the term the 
psychological¾even a neuro-liberal¾state 14, referring to the use of psychologists and 
cognitive scientists in the creation of behavioural public policies. Nudge’s origins in 
economics is part of the reason why these critics think behavioural sciences give primacy to 
individual-level analysis and non-structural forms of knowledge. Behavioural public policy 
might be thought to be allied to public choice theory, which justifies the doctrines of the 
new public management leading to contracting-out, market systems of competition, 
incentivisation, and measures to introduce performance-related-pay 15. However, 
behavioural economics does not depend on a strict version of the rational model. Nudge 
can be regarded as less abstracted from everyday reality of citizens than the model of the 
individual in conventional economics. In fact, a contrary position can be advocated: nudge 
might operate beyond the ideologies that have typically affected neo-liberal projects. A 
behavioural analysis could imply that that neo-liberal schemes, such as contracting out and 
market competition, are likely to fail because they are not based on realistic human 
psychology, such as people not responding to the level of incentives. Nudge might be seen 
as consistent with critique of neoliberalism as it is based on a broader more socialised 
conception of human nature than rational-actor models.  
 The main argument of the critics, however, is not about the nature of behavioural 
models, but that they are de-politicised¾that is introduced as if social and political 
relationships are not there, making government policies a panacea for social problems 
without taking account of wider social structures and obscuring the social and political 
                                                        
13 Leggett, ‘The Politics of Behaviour Change’. 
14 Whitehead et al., Neuroliberalism. 
15 Hay, ‘The Normalizing Role of Rationalist Assumptions in the Institutional Embedding of Neoliberalism’. 
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relationships at their core 16. For example, a nudge designed to improve tax collection might 
not consider why some people cannot pay, such as those in debt, making sections of the 
population invisible to those who design nudges. In fact, this line of criticism is not entirely 
true either since there is a big debate about the heterogeneity of treatment effects and 
their effects on different communities or subgroups, such as for tax collection 17.  
 As part of the debate about the progenitors of neo-liberalism, it might also follow 
that nudge might work better with political parties on the right as champions of market-
based approaches, though of course one of the critiques of social democratic parties, such 
as Labour in Britain, is that it moved to integrate itself with neo-liberal processes and 
practices, how ‘New Labour’, as it was called, normalised neo-liberalism 18. There is a 
different line of argument that, in spite of the integration of New Labour into an 
accommodation with market forces, the party at that time is better seen as a hybrid, 
moderating its market preferences by the strong commitment to state intervention and 
generous social policies 19. Whichever the interpretation, it is not clear from these 
literatures whether governments of the left or right are more susceptible to the use of 
behavioural insights. Both could be neo-liberal and both use behavioural insights. Probably a 
stronger factor might be the commitment to utilitarian insights in public policy. This would 
appeal more to centrist politicians and to moderate left and right allies, rather than radical-
left or nativist-right politicians.  
 Country factors might be important on their own, as well as being different sites 
for the expression of neo-liberalism. The diffusion of behavioural insights partly relates to 
the origins of behavioural economics in the US and UK and groups of economists working 
                                                        
16 Jones, Pykett, and Whitehead, Changing Behaviours. 
17 John, Sanders, and Wang, ‘The Use of Descriptive Norms in Public Administration’. 
18 Hay, ‘The Normalizing Role of Rationalist Assumptions in the Institutional Embedding of Neoliberalism’. 
19 Beech, Neoliberalism, New Labour, and the Welfare State. 
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there, and a supportive environment in the quality press. In histories of the development of 
behavioural economics, a lot of traction is given to the importance of private US foundations 
in encouraging the development of behavioural units which encourage the diffusion from 
small circles of economists to a wider influence in economics and beyond 20. The power and 
wealth of these funders was an important motivator, as was the east coast intellectual 
culture of the US with its research universities and supportive networks, and behavioural 
economics was well represented in the outputs of elite media outlets, such as The New York 
Times 21. Newly created specialist research institutes and companies, often led by 
academics, as well more established consultancies, were keen to have government agencies 
sponsor new research and practice, and helped create a more policy-relevant message from 
academic studies so encouraging the transfer. Nudge was also supported by mature 
bureaucracies in the UK and US, where officials traditionally funded (or encouraged 
research councils to fund) the acquisition of scientific knowledge for outcomes that 
maximise social welfare, and were comfortable using academics, such as economists for 
advice, though of course this happens right across OECD countries and elsewhere. 
 The role of academics as promoters is an established phenomenon in the US, and 
Richard Thaler became a celebrity academic, as recounted in his recent book 22. The UK 
culture is more reserved and less outward facing; but academic economics is traditionally 
important in policy evaluation and there are close links between academia and government, 
which means the civil service is sympathetic to behavioural economics 23. In addition, as 
John 24 argues, personalities and chance conjunctions were important in the development of 
                                                        
20 Lewis, The Undoing Project. 
21 John, How Far to Nudge? 
22 Thaler, Misbehaving. 
23 John and Richardson, ‘Nudging Citizens towards Localism?’ 
24 How Far to Nudge? 
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behavioural public policy, especially in the UK context, with a sympathetic Cabinet 
Secretary, Gus O’Donnell, a former academic economist, as a keen champion. The politics 
was favourable with the socially progressive conservative leader of the Conservative party, 
David Cameron, keen to show his reformist credentials in a temporarily modernised 
Conservative Party. In the US, nudge was helped by the academically-inclined US President 
Obama. The conclusion to draw is that there were contingent factors that helped nudge get 
established in the UK and US, with links to other Anglo-American influence countries 
through contact and emulation, which are traditionally analysed together as a group of 
countries with particular characteristics so likely to adopt together 25, as with the new public 
management reforms 26. Both US and UK politics have changed a lot since that time, which 
means that it would have been unlikely that a behavioural unit would have been established 
after 2016, the year Trump got elected and the British public voted for Brexit, which seem 
to indicate that populist politicians might be less in favour of top-down technocratic 
policies.27 The overall conclusion to draw is that rather than as an expression of the 
neoliberal state or the practice of psychological governance, agency and context played a 
role in establishing behavioural public policies and nudge units, which reveals a more open 
and political process than that conveyed in the critical literature 28.  
 It is likely that contingency played a role in other countries too, but it is to be 
expected that more natural diffusion processes are present, which come from competition 
and emulation. In diffusion theory (see below) the adoption of innovations is path 
dependent and based on existing networks, such as professional associations or informal 
                                                        
25 Castles, ‘The Dynamics of Policy Change’. 
26 Peters, ‘Policy Transfers between Governments’; Pollitt and Bouckaert, Public Management Reform. 
27 For a discussion of the relationship between populism and nudge see the newly-written epilogue in John et 
al., Nudge, Nudge, Think, Think. 
28 John, ‘Behavioural Science, Randomized Evaluations and the Transformation of Public Policy: The Case of the 
UK Government’. 
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contacts. International organisations may play a role in diffusion of behavioural insights, 
especially if they are dominated by economists, such as the World Bank 29, which published 
a report on behavioural sciences, and the OECD, which has been important in 
commissioning reviews and studies, as well as the European Union which is a major sponsor 
of research (see https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/behavioural-
insights). Consultancies and think tanks have traditionally been important in the diffusion of 
ideas 30, and behavioural sciences should not be thought about as an exception to this 
pattern. Advocates of behavioural insights have been particularly entrepreneurial. Partly as 
a result, there is a demand for ideas, revealing nudge to have the classic feature of policy 
transfer 31. Countries have sought to learn from the use of behavioural sciences as they 
adapt them to their own contexts. This active and intellectual component to policy transfer 
is stressed in the literature 32 and is consistent with how behavioural insights have been 
adopted, particularly through academic contacts, and visits, and face-to-face seminars. 
These characteristics of the international network on behavioural public policy highlights 
the importance of policy learning and ideas in the policy process 33. 
 In spite of this active process and the high engagement of policy-makers, some 
countries might be more resistant to the use of behavioural insights because of the lack of 
factors that played a role in the US and UK, and also because their bureaucracies might be 
dominated by lawyers preoccupied with process and ethics. There are different institutional 
traditions that affect the popularity of behavioural public policy. Moreover, journalists 
                                                        
29 World Development Report 2015. 
30 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination. 
31 Dolowitz and Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad’; Stone, ‘Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the 
‘Transnationalization’of Policy’. 
32 Shipan and Volden, ‘The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion’. 
33 Sabatier, Policy Change And Learning; Moyson, Scholten, and Weible, ‘Policy Learning and Policy Change’; 
Dunlop, Radaelli, and Trein, Learning in Public Policy. 
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outside the US and UK, even those in the quality press, might not be so sympathetic to 
economists, and may see it as a foreign North American phenomenon aligned with 
globalisation which should be resisted in favour of homegrown policy solutions. Learning is a 
complex process and depends on the engagement of officials and experts which can vary 
according to context 34. If this argument is accepted, path dependence is part of the process 
of diffusion and may explain the timing of adoptions. 
Patterns of adoption are explained, at least in part, by theories of diffusion and 
represent the academic interest in the emulation of social practices and a need to 
understand their transfer. In more recent studies, the interest is directed to the pattern of 
the diffusion, in particular of innovations, especially in studies of the S-curve, the 
importance of innovators and the gradual isolation of laggards, promoted by Rogers book, 
first published in 1962 35. In public policy, there has been the long interest in policy transfer 
noted above 36, with more recent contributions in the study of European public policy 37.  
Attention to measurement and methods appears in the literature on US state 
politics, which can be seen to be laboratory for innovations that are adopted within the 
national system 38. There are studies using event history analysis to map and assess the 
pattern, such as for environmental and health policies 39. Recent work has focused on using 
more advanced statistical models, such as spatial regression, and is linked to the 
international political economy literature 40. The debate in the 2010s has been about an 
                                                        
34 Dunlop, ‘Policy Learning and Policy Failure’. 
35 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 4th Edition. 
36 Rose, ‘What Is Lesson-Drawing?’ 
37 Radaelli, ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union’; Dunlop and Radaelli, ‘Policy Learning in the Eurozone 
Crisis’. 
38 Walker, ‘The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States’. 
39 e.g. Berry and Berry, ‘State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations’; Mintrom and Vergari, ‘Policy Networks 
and Innovation Diffusion’. 
40 e.g. Cao, ‘Networks as Channels of Policy Diffusion’. 
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exact specification of the causal relationships in spatial regression models 41. There is a more 
general focus on mechanisms behind diffusion and being precise about them 42. 
 The conclusion to draw from reading the literatures on behavioural insights, policy 
transfer, and diffusion is that there is good reason to expect the transfer of nudge units and 
behavioural initiatives to be path dependent because of the appearance of behavioural 
economics in prominent Anglo-American democracies, UK and US, associated with the 
prominence of neo-liberal ideas in these places, and then for diffusion to happen within this 
country group as with other policies, such as new public management. An alternative model 
is the extent to which European countries tend to adopt together, which might be enhanced 
because of the UK’s prominence in behavioural insights and close proximity as well as 
interest in behavioural policy by the EU. In terms of politics, we might expect nudge to 
prosper more with centre politicians in place rather than those from the right or left, though 
we also expect politicians of all stripes except nativist right or extreme left to be interested 
in behavioural insights to a degree, but with the centre as the favoured ground. These 
considerations based on country characteristics and political complexion can be considered 
to be expectations to test in competing statistical models, implemented in the following 
sections. 
 
Methods and data collection 
The basic idea behind the methods and data collection for this study is to see whether the 
adoption of nudge reflects its dominance in the Anglo-American sphere, in particular 
whether there is a more general diffusion of nudge beyond the places where behavioural 
                                                        
41 Gilardi, ‘Four Ways We Can Improve Policy Diffusion Research’; Ward and John, ‘Competitive Learning in 
Yardstick Competition’; Plümper and Neumayer, ‘Model Specification in the Analysis of Spatial Dependence’. 
42 Maggetti and Gilardi, ‘Problems (and Solutions) in the Measurement of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms’. 
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economics became a dominant voice and whether countries outside the Anglo-US sphere 
are observed to follow in a natural diffusion pattern. The focus here is on the adoption of a 
centrally organised behavioural units or networks as an expression of official interest in 
nudge, which creates the step shift associated with a policy adoption as noted in the 
diffusion literature. Of course, there are many kinds of adoption of behavioural insights, 
which may include a more general interest in developing nudge, such as in a network 
operating across several government departments, which works for some contexts, such as 
the Netherlands 43, or one department taking a lead. One person might the focus, who 
occupies an official position, like with Cass Sunstein. It may be the case that the nudge unit 
operates outside government, but with contracts with departments or agencies to deliver 
services. Even the most famous nudge unit, the Behavioural Insights Team, now operates 
outside government so might not even qualify as one. In this research, the interest is in 
having a measure of a nudge unit or the functional equivalent that takes account of these 
different circumstances, but recognises the step-change in official interest which represents 
the extent of the policy diffusion. The definition of the policy adoption used is: an integrated 
and focused official interest and sponsorship of behavioural public policy, which may be 
expressed as: a) a nudge unit operating out of a prime minister’s or Treasury department, 
with civil servants seconded to it and with an official role, which sums up BIT in its early 
phase; b) a network or partnership of central departments and agencies behind behavioural 
public policy where there are links between civil servants interest in promoting nudges, 
which is typical of official interest in the Netherlands; c) an external nudge unit, such as a 
non-profit body, but with strong relationships to central government and where central 
government regards the unit as important in delivering improvements even if the units 
                                                        
43 Feitsma, ‘Brokering Behaviour Change’. 
 14 
works across many jurisdictions, the new BIT model; and d) where one prominent official is 
given a role that incorporates nudges in the job definition and represents the level of official 
interest which was Cass Sunstein’s post in the Obama administration in the US. In this 
definition, there are some challenges in creating a variable where some units/time periods 
score zero and others have a one score. With a nudge unit, there is a clear start date and 
launch of the unit, which might have official press, and can be seen as the commencement 
date. That said, there is likely to be behaviour change initiatives happening before the 
nudge unit started, but the idea behind the coding is that unit is about a step-change in 
these initiatives. The b part of the definition is more complex because a network is more 
diffuse, but the idea is that there is some announcement or where an official document 
proclaims the initiative and some evidence that more behavioural policy initiatives followed 
from this. C is also hard to code because there are many private nudge units and the 
challenge is identifying whether the initiative represents official interest or is just about 
researchers or lobbyists getting organised. Official contracted research and evaluation is 
important and maybe a mention of the government on the website of the group. D would 
need some kind of post created or changed or the occupant being clearly seen as an 
advocate of these policies. In the research to create the database, there is a need to find the 
level of interest and also to find an exact date in official documentation.  
 The other issue is the spatial level. One is that nudge is sometimes the property of 
international organisations as well as countries, but this is hard to fit into an event history 
model or diffusion model which needs equivalent actors. Similarly, it might be possible to 
include the use of nudges by state or local governments as this is where nudges might be 
adopted, maybe more so than in central sponsor departments as they are closer to the 
delivery level where these insights have more applications. It may be the case in a federal 
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state, with considerable decentralisation, state-sponsored nudge policy would be equivalent 
to that at the central level in a smaller unitary state. For this analysis, however, state or 
local-level nudge units are excluded for the reasons of equivalence mentioned above; but it 
might be possible in future to include the states as separate units or incorporate them in 
central scores or at least to include different measures of attention to nudge at the 
subnational level as part of robustness checks for the statistical models. Qualitative work 
would also be important in assessing their impact. For similar reasons of creating 
equivalence, nudge units in international organisations are excluded. 
 It is possible to sample all countries in the world, but in practice behavioural public 
policies have appeared first in developed contexts, making a sample with all countries with 
too many zeros for effective analysis. The other issue is that data collection and sample 
selection for this research used as a starting point the OECD survey of behaviour change 
across its members and partner countries 44. As part of its task, OECD sought to ascertain 
the leadership for nudge in many jurisdictions which gives an indication of the official 
engagement with behavioural insights in this domain. It adopts a similar approach to this 
paper when defining the coordination of behavioural public policy, differentiating between 
a central steering model and diffuse model, as well as a further project model. These first 
two definitions are key to the measurement of adoption as operationalised for this paper. 
The OECD data does not have an exact measurement of the timing of the adoption of 
behavioural insights in each country, which is needed for this study; but it shows whether 
the sampling makes sense overall even if exact measurement needed in the further desk 
search. Figure 1 shows a summary from the report of central coordination by country 
ascertained from the 2016 survey, which also produces a useful list of eighteen countries to 
                                                        
44 OECD, ‘Behavioural Insights and Public Policy - Lessons from Around the World - En - OECD’. 
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consider for inclusion as centrally sponsored behavioural initiatives 45. Though not with such 
large coverage, another study also justified the sampling, which was by the European Union 
46, which reports individual country surveys of the use of behavioural insights, which are in 
turn published separately with documents to summarise the extent of institutional support. 
With these two reports as the impetus, the data collection for this paper sampled forty-two 
OECD and OECD-partner countries. Then the coding of the adoption of behavioural insights 
and its timing relied on identifying an initiative from official reports or an authoritative 
source. As well as the OECD and EU surveys, it involved noting a behavioural unit when 
mentioned in academic publications 47, then following up with internet searches. The 
summary of these searches is contained in the Appendix, which notes the nature of the 
initiative, the date of its inception, and the sources used. The United States of America is a 
different case because it drops out of the dataset when Trump abolished the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST) in January 2017. Because the paper is interested in 
predicting adoption not in multiple outcomes over time, this analysis does not account for 
this reversal in the US context. But this could be done in future research using time-varying 
measures for both independent and dependent variables in a panel design. 
 
  
                                                        
45 OECD, ‘Government at a Glance 2017’, 168. 
46 Sounsa et al., ‘Behavioural Insights Applied to Policy - European Report 2016’. 
47 Halpern and Sanders, ‘Nudging by Government’; Balzo, Nudging in the UK, in the USA, in Denmark, in Italy. 
Afif, ‘“Nudge Units” – Where They Came from and What They Can Do’, Let’s Talk Development, 25 October 
2017. http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/nudge-units-where-they-came-and-what-they-can-do. 
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Figure 1: Share of public bodies in countries using behavioural insights “at least some of 




 The independent variables designed to test the pattern of diffusion for this paper 
are time invariant. The basic demographic variables are collected from 
http://gsociology.icaap.org/dataupload.html and comprise GDP as a predictor of overall 
capacity and resources to commission research-led initiatives. Then an Anglo-American 
variable is designed to test for Anglo-American dominance in the pattern of diffusion, which 
core to this paper, which includes UK and US and a larger Anglo-American country group. 
For this study, the variable is coded one for the US, UK, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and 
Ireland, then zero for all other cases. Then there is a country variable of West European 
countries, taking the value of one for these with others coded as zero, designed to reflect 
contiguous patterns of diffusion in this region, that they are key EU members, and their 
geographical proximity to the Behavioural Insights Team. For robustness and to reflect EU 
processes, a variable comprised of EU members is created, with EU coded as one, with the 
others taking the value of zero. The final variable might be time-varying and that is political 
control. It is derived from Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2016 (CPDS).48 Two variables 
are of interest: gov_right which is government compositions: cabinet posts of right-wing 
parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts weighted by the number of days in office in a 
given year. Similarly, gov_left is  cabinet posts of social democratic and other left parties as 
a percentage of total cabinet posts weighted in the same way. There are a few country gaps 
that needed to be filled manually by searching databases and using new sources. Because of 
the lack of other time-varying variables in the rest of dataset, this variable is used for the 
start time only, but for robustness the variable is adjusted to take a different value at the 
time of transfer (which does not make much difference to the results). 
                                                        
48 Klaus Armingeon and Romana Careja. 2007. Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-
2007. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern. Updated on http://www.cpds-data.org 
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 The analysis uses event history analysis (sometimes called survival analysis) typical 
of the study of diffusion in US states, which is concerned with explaining the timing of an 
event as well as its occurrence 49. This enables an understanding the pattern of diffusion in 
that the variables predict the timing of the innovation. The analysis here uses Cox 
proportional hazards, a common event history model that can estimate a ‘failure rate’ 50. 
Failure rate here measures the probability of adoption. There is a goodness of fit measure 
for Cox models similar to Hosmer-Lemeshow test for logistic regression, which is reported 
alongside the hazard ratios and standard errors in Table 1. For visual interpretation, it is 
possible to show graphs of the cumulative change in the survival rate of the time of the 
study. A commonly used measure is the Kaplan–Meier estimator, a cumulative hazard 
function that plots the change in the survival rate over time as it grows, in this case the time 
without a nudge unit. It is possible to present graphs for different groups of variables, which 
is of interest for this paper, so Figure 2 plots the Anglo-American countries against the rest, 
then Figure 3 does the same for West Europe. This also has the advantage of being a visual 
check to see whether the proportional hazard assumption holds in the model: the two 
slopes need to be parallel. Another test for violation of the assumption of the model is to 
detect whether the slopes of the plots of the residuals are not zero, which have been 
implemented for the models in this paper (see discussion below). 
 The dataset starts on 1 June 2009 as a date after the publication of Nudge so giving 
countries enough time to put in place measures or a unit, but before the appointment of 
Cass Sunstein in September 2009 which is the first event in our data base. In the language of 
event history, the dataset is not left-censored.51 It may be right-censored in that the end 
                                                        
49 Yamaguchi, Event History Analysis; Allison, Event History and Survival Analysis. 
50 Cox, ‘Regression Models and Life-Tables’; O’Quigley, Proportional Hazards Regression. 
51 The dataset and commands to produce the results may be obtained by contacting the author directly. 
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date is just the date when the research was completed, which is 31 October 2018. The data 




The coding produced eighteen nudge initiatives across the countries. Countries with 
coordinated nudge interventions are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States (see Appendix). The regression results are 
contained in Table 1, with two models that include different political variables: model A 
reports estimates for cabinets of left and right with centre as the reference value; model B 
reports the impact of centre cabinets with left and right shares as the reference value. 
Conventional levels of statistical significance are reported by stars, but variables that meet 
the ninety per cent probability threshold are marked with crosses. 
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Table 1: Central government adoption of nudges, Cox proportional hazard ratios 
 
 
   
 A B 
VARIABLES   
   
GDP 1.000 1.000 
 (2.83e-05) (2.76e-05) 
West Europe 2.280 2.162 
 (1.406) (1.315) 
Anglo-US 5.370* 7.208** 
 (3.701) (4.745) 
gov_left -0.976*  
 (0.0117)  
gov_right -0.985  
 (0.0102)  
gov_centre  1.0+ 
  (2.76e-05) 
   
Fit .6964 .3354 
   
Observations 42 42 
Standard error in parentheses 
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Overall, the results from the event history analysis show that some of the variables 
to be predictive of adoption. GDP does not appear to be a factor, though the coefficient is in 
the positive expected direction. The key finding is that the Anglo-American variable is 
predictive and statistically significant, showing that these countries tended to adopt first as 
predicted by the classic literature on nudge. From this analysis, nudge is indeed an Anglo-
American phenomenon. The hazard ratio is the highest among the variables, which suggests 
that these democracies are between five and seven times more likely to adopt nudge units 
earlier than the other countries. One caveat is that this variable fails on the proportional-
hazards assumption with a non-zero slope (p=  0.0179). However, this might be feature of 
the multivariate regression (which contains observations coded both as both Anglo-
American and West European – that is the UK and Ireland). When running the variable in a 
bivariate model, the Anglo-American term remains positive (4.12, p=.005) and with a non-
zero slope of the residuals (p=.2451). All other variables pass this check in univariate 
models. Another worry is that the coding is dependent on a particular interpretation of the 
use of behavioural insights in the US, from when Cass Sunstein was appointed, shortly after 
President Obama took office. The nudge unit, The Social and Behavioral Sciences Team 
(SBST), started during the second term of office on 15 September 2015 (Executive Order 
#13707).  Re-running the analysis, using the later time of adoption for the US, produces 
similar results in terms of strength and significance of the coefficients. The West European 
coefficient moves into the significant range (p<0.1) and there is a reduction in the size of the 
US hazard ratio (p<0.05). But broadly the results are similar. 
The other key country group variable that is positive is West European countries, but 
this is not significant in the multivariate model. In a bivariate model, however, the variable 
is significant at the ten per cent level (2.26, p=.087), so there may be some diffusion through 
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these countries (note the earlier caution about the overlaps of Anglo-American and West 
European variables). For robustness, a new variable of EU membership was tested, but this 
is decisively non-significant, both in multi- and bivariate models. 
Figure 2 plots the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate over time (years) for 
Anglo-American democracies and the rest, plotting ninety per cent confidence intervals 
above and below these estimates. Failure should read as likelihood of adoption that 
increases over time. Though the differences between these curves is at times non-
significant as the confidence intervals cross-over, there does appear to be an early period 
when nudge units/initiatives were significantly more likely to be adopted in Anglo-American 
democracies than elsewhere, reflecting the early wave of adoptions from 2010 as the first 
nudge units increasingly became successful and were keen to extend their reach, especially 
the UK Behavioural Insights Team, which became independent (though still co-owned) from 
government as a not-for-profit at that time and engaged in more overseas work and in 
partnerships with other agencies and governments. First chosen was Australia, though New 
Zealand and Canada had to wait until later. The confidence intervals are very wide for the 
Anglo-American variable, which might reflect the US and UK that established their 
behavourial initiatives at the start of this period with later adoptions in this group; in 
contrast, there are narrower confidence intervals for the non-Anglo-American group. 
Overall, there is a consistent difference between the two groups over time. Figure 3 
presents the same estimates for West European democracies, which shows a similar pattern 
but without this early trend. The wave of EU countries adopting nudge came much later in 
the mid-2010s, which is reflected in this figure, where the divergence happens after about 
three and a half years from the start.  
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 The political variables of interest are reflected in the choice of models A and B. 
Model A introduces left and right, with centre as the reference category. The negative sign 
predicts a lower probability so has a longer time without a nudge unit, which applies to left-
dominated governments. There is no impact for right  governments. In model B, centre 
governments are more likely to adopt (significant at the ten per cent level). The caveat is 
that these political measures are taken at the start of the data series and have changed in 
some cases at the time of adoption.  Future work using time-varying covariates for the 





Overall, the findings show there is path dependence in the diffusion of nudge through early 
adoption by the Anglo-American democracies. It does appear then the nudge is an Anglo-
American phenomenon, at least in explaining the early period. The path dependence does 
not apply to Western Europe that could have been the focus. There is a tendency for it to be 
adopted by governments with more ministers in the centre than otherwise and left 
government are less likely to adopt. Given what is known about the diffusion of nudge from 
surveys and reviews, these results show it is less suited to contexts where ideology is 
prevalent, especially left-dominated governments. It is more likely to be adopted with 
particular kinds of political institutions, such as those in the UK, US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Ireland, even though nudge initiatives were eventually adopted in other OECD 
countries and partners.  
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Countries outside OECD and its partners may still take comfort that nudge an 
adaptable phenomenon which works well in any stable context, including non-democratic 
states, such as Singapore in the dataset here, and could be adopted in China. The practical 
advantages of nudge policies are likely to appeal to a range of agencies interested in 
engaging citizens in public policies, such as over the environment. As nudge does not have 
an overt political component or ideological fixed point, it does not challenge the political 
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Appendix: List of nudge units/networks and sources 
 
Nudge Unit Nature of unit Date of inception Source 
1. Australia Nudge Unit: 
Behavioural 
Economics Team of 
the Australian 




Journal of Behavioral 
Economics for Policy, 
Vol. 1, Special Issue, 
21-26, 2017 




team: Three lessons 
from the Behavioural 
Economics Team of 
the Australian 
Government, 
by Sarah Ball, 
Michael Hiscox, Tara 
Oliver.  









stupsen, cited in 
OECD country 
survey.  




















and Giulio del Balzo 
Nudging in the UK, in 
the USA, in Denmark, 






Thesis · July 2015, p. 
35. 
5. Finland Prime Minister Office 
initiative 





10.1.2015, also OECD 
(2016) Finland 
Country Overview 




7. Germany Nudge unit 26.08.14 
 
Report in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 
26.08.2014 
8. Greece Nudge Unit Greece 01.12.2016 
 





















Department of Public 
Expenditure & 
Reform, speaking at 
the Whitaker 
Conference on How 
(Not) to Do Public 







10. Israel Team the Budget 
Division of the 
Ministry of Finance 
1.1.2017 Behavioral Methods 










11. Japan Ministry of the 
Environment  
14.4.2017 Ministry of 
Environment, The 
establishment of the 




12.The Netherlands Behavioural Insights 
Network 






Papers) 34000XIII no. 






Netherlands, p. 6  
13. New Zealand Behavioural Insights 
Community of 
Practice, also BIT unit 
19.4.2017 Behavioural Insights 
Community of 
Practice 


















































17. US  
 
 
Administrator of the 
Office of Information 
and Regulatory 














1.7.2010 Behavioral Insights 
Team, Annual 
Update 2010-2011, 
https://assets.publis
hing.service.gov.uk/g
overnment/uploads/
system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/60
537/Behaviour-
Change-Insight-
Team-Annual-
Update_acc.pdf 
 
